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Abstract 
 
The initiative to form an “Alliance of Civilizations” as a means to overcome cultural and political 
gaps originated in a proposal made by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations during a speech at the 59th UN General Assembly on September 21, 2004. 
  
Kofi Annan officially took over the initiative, co-sponsored by the UN, the Spanish and the Turkish 
governments, on July 14, 2005. The Secretary-General also put in place a process to form a High 
Level Panel, which is expected to hold its first meeting in late November, in order to convert this 
first impulse into a feasible and operative concept by the end of 2006. 
 
On June 6-7, 2005, the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) and the Funda-
ción para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) organized an international 
seminar in Madrid, bringing together experts, academics and practitioners to analyse contemporary 
challenges, reflect critically on their implications for the present initiative, and enhance and enrich 
it. 
 
The present paper summarizes the main ideas for an Alliance of Civilizations, the major critical 
points, and the suggestions made, during the seminar, in order to tackle them. 
 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
 
La propuesta de formar una “Alianza de Civilizaciones” para superar las divergencias políticas y 
culturales tuvo su origen en la propuesta de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero al Secretario General en 
un discurso ante la 59ª Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 21 de septiembre de 2004.  
 
El 14 de julio de 2005, Kofi Annan oficialmente adoptó la iniciativa, co-auspiciada por Naciones 
Unidas y los gobiernos de España y Turquía, y puso en marcha un proceso para formar un Grupo 
de Alto Nivel, cuya primera reunión se espera para finales de noviembre, con el objetivo de 
convertir este primer impulso en un concepto viable y operativo hasta finales de 2006. 
 
Los días 6 y 7 de junio de 2005, el Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) y la 
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) organizaron un 
seminario internacional en Madrid, con el objetivo de analizar retos contemporáneos y sus 
implicaciones para el futuro concepto de una Alianza de Civilizaciones. El presente documento de 
trabajo resume las principales ideas, puntos críticos y sugerencias surgidas en el seminario. 
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1. The Alliance of 
Civilizations Initiative 
 
1. The Alliance of Civilizations initiative 
originated in a proposal made by the Spa-
nish President of Government, José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, to the Secretary-Ge-
neral of the United Nations, during a 
speech at the 59th UN General Assembly on 
September 21, 2004. Zapatero presented 
his idea to form an “Alliance of Civiliza-
tions” as a means to overcome cultural and 
political gaps, and called on the Secretary-
General to adopt the initiative.  
 
2. The proposal was taken up by the Spa-
nish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel 
Ángel Moratinos, in his address before the 
Arab League the following December, as 
well as in an intervention held together 
with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 
March 9, 2005, in Madrid. The Secretary-
General officially took over the initiative 
on July 14, and put in place a process to 
form a High Level Panel in order to con-
vert this first impulse into a feasible and 
operative concept.  
 
3. A working group, composed of repre-
sentatives from the UN and the Spanish 
government, was formed to bring forward 
that process. For this purpose, Kofi Annan 
appointed Iqbal Riza and Giandomenico 
Picco as Special Advisers. On behalf of the 
Spanish government, which was asked by 
the Secretary-General to take a leading role 
in bringing forward the initiative, Ambas-
sadors Máximo Cajal and Juan Antonio Yá-
ñez were appointed. This working group 
has elaborated an initial concept paper for 
the Alliance of Civilizations to serve as a 
basis for the work of a High Level Panel 
which was nominated by the Secretary-
General on September 5, 2005, and which 
is expected to hold its first meeting in late 
November. 
 
4. The composition of the Panel counts 
with a wide regional and civilizational re-
presentation, and comprises politicians out 
of office, academics with a religious-
cultural background, media representati-
ves and other representatives of the diffe-
rent civilizational entities. A list of the 18-
member Panel and its terms of reference 
will be made available shortly. The High 
Level Panel will be supported by a secreta-
riat in its task to elaborate a set of recom-
mendations to the UN Secretary-General 
by the end of 2006, and to issue an action 
plan with concrete, practical measures.  
 
5. The Turkish government, represented 
by Prime Minister Erdogan, agreed to co-
sponsor the initiative alongside with the 
Spanish government and the UN. This 
Turkish co-sponsorship is symbolically ex-
tremely valuable and constitutes a strong 
political signal. 
 
6. Beyond the question of co-sponsorship, 
an informal group of 19 states and two or-
ganizations already expressed their sup-
port for the Alliance of Civilizations initia-
tive. These are: Argentina, Costa Rica, E-
gypt, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Malay-
sia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, Phi-
lippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, 
Tanzania, Thailand, and Tunisia, as well as 
the Arab League and the Islamic Con-
ference. 
  
7. Parting from a general unease due to the 
widening gaps between certain parts of the 
world, the Instituto Complutense de Estu-
dios Internacionales (ICEI) and the Fun-
dación para las Relaciones Internacionales 
y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), two institu-
tions dedicated to the studies of Interna-
tional Relations, were both convinced that 
this was an initiative that was put forward 
at the right time and which was worth sup-
porting through assistance to its further 
development. On June 6-7, 2005, FRIDE 
and ICEI, in collaboration with Univer-
sidad Complutense, Caja Madrid and the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation, organized an international 
seminar in Madrid, bringing together ex-
perts, academics and practitioners to ana-
lyse contemporary challenges and reflect 
critically on their implications for the pre-
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sent initiative, enhance and enrich it and 
think of ways of making a real impact. 
 
8. The seminar was attended by a wide 
range of academic scholars, experts, diplo-
mats, journalists, as well as representatives 
of the United Nations, the Spanish govern-
ment and civil society. Particularly welco-
med was the presence of the representa-
tives of the Spanish government for the 
Alliance of Civilizations, Máximo Cajal 
and Juan Antonio Yáñez, and the Special 
Adviser on behalf of the UN, Iqbal Riza. 
The debates were organised around four 
sessions where the following issues were 
discussed: possible contents of an Alliance 
of Civilizations; which is or could be Eu-
rope’s role in the relation between the 
West and the Islamic world; how does the 
Alliance of Civilizations fit into the multi-
lateral framework of global society, espe-
cially in terms of international law; and fi-
nally, which could be the role of civil so-
ciety within the framework of this Allian-
ce?  
 
9. The present conclusions summarize the 
main ideas for an Alliance of Civilizations, 
major critical points, challenges, and the 
suggestions made in order to tackle them. 
 
 
 
 
2. The Need for an Alliance of 
Civilizations: Global 
Challenges 
 
10. The first set of issues was related to the 
present intercultural and intercivilizational 
relations, the nature of existing tensions 
and their possible root causes. 
 
 
2.1. GROWING GAPS 
 
11. An immediate criticism of the Alliance 
of Civilizations which had arisen after its 
proposal by the Spanish Head of Govern-
ment before the UN claimed that the pro-
posal took for granted the existence of the 
entity “civilization” as a compact and more 
or less closed reality, thereby indirectly, or 
partially, confirming Samuel Huntington’s 
theory of a “clash of civilizations”. The de-
bate on a possible “clash”, as predicted by 
Huntington in 1993, is indeed closely lin-
ked to some of the core issues of the 
Alliance of Civilizations. However, there 
was agreement among the participants of 
the seminar that Huntington’s theory has 
had a highly unconstructive effect on pu-
blic discourse, poisoning public debate 
and people’s minds for over a decade with 
ideas that have been feeding hostile at-
titudes.  
 
12. Up until the 18th century, the term “ci-
vilization” described the opposite of barba-
rism. Today it has gained a new meaning 
as a virtual synonym for culture and socie-
ty. Huntington’s definition of a civilization 
is similar: “A civilization is a cultural en-
tity [...] the highest cultural grouping of 
people and the broadest level of cultural 
identity people have [...].”1 According to 
Huntington, “[t]he great divisions of man-
kind and the dominating source of conflict 
will be cultural.”2, and a clash of civiliza-
tions will occur between nations and mem-
bers of different civilizations, with the fault 
lines between civilizations as the battle li-
nes of the future. After the Cold War, he 
says, the two blocks of capitalism and 
communism will be replaced by “the West 
versus the rest” as the main line of con-
flict. But the creation of fault lines between 
cultures, civilizations and societies, so his-
tory has shown, can only happen over ti-
me. And which are the borders of civili-
zations? According to Huntington, a civili-
zation is the broadest level of identification 
an individual can participate in, and this 
identification lays the foundation for the 
clash that is to come, with the main source 
of conflict being the antagonistic relation-
ship between the “West” and the “Islamic 
World”. 
 
13. According to some participants, Hun-
tington’s theory had been granted too 
                                                 
1 Huntington, Samuel P.: “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign 
Affairs, nº 3/1993. 
2 Ibid. 
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much scientific significance, and was best 
opposed by ignoring it. However, in prac-
tice, the theory has attracted vast attention, 
and no matter to what degree one might 
consider the “clash of civilizations” to re-
flect current realities, there is no doubt 
that it has been successfully used in 
Western political discourse for agitation 
against Islam. Similar discourses – cons-
piracy theories, demonization of the Wes-
tern culture - exist in Islamic countries. So 
even though Huntington’s general picture 
might be simplistic, cut and dried - all jus-
tified critique of his ideas cannot distract 
from the fact that we do face an authentic 
threat: the enormous intensification of 
hostile perceptions between the “Islamic 
World” and “the West”. As we have had to 
witness in the past, the manifestation of 
these hostile perceptions through violence 
can do terrible harm. The confrontation 
between the Islamic World and the West 
has reached a civilizational dimension. 
This is why we need an Alliance of Civi-
lizations.  
 
14. There was consensus among the work-
shop participants that the current confron-
tation and the whole discourse on conflict 
and dialogue between civilizations are at 
its heart about the relationship between 
the “Arab-Islamic World“ and the “West”. 
Consequently, the improvement of this re-
lationship was considered a key issue of 
future action of an Alliance of Civiliza-
tions. Moreover, it was expressed that the 
term “civilization” was used only for rea-
sons of political correctness or politeness. 
Nevertheless, it was clear to most people 
that from the Western point of view, the 
term was mainly aimed at religion in gene-
ral and Islam in particular. This impres-
sion seemed indirectly confirmed in the 
context of the seminar by the regional re-
presentation of the speakers, who exclu-
sively originated from Western and Islamic 
countries.  
 
15. In an attempt to explain the narrow fo-
cus of a debate which should actually be of 
global scale, it was expressed that the ini-
tiative to form an Alliance of Civilizations 
was a merely reactive framework: on the 
one hand, responding to Huntington’s ar-
gument, trying to soften it and reduce the 
damage by providing a human, anti-racist 
concept using the same terms, and on the 
other hand, reacting to the fact that the 
USA and Spain were, for the first time, the 
main targets of large-scale terrorist attacks, 
which eventually led to the powerful agen-
da-setters calling for a global remedy. O-
thers considered that, given the increa-
singly hostile perceptions among some ci-
vilizations, Zapatero’s proposal was simply 
a pro-active initiative at the right time.  
 
16. However, there was no doubt that the 
growing tension between the West and the 
Islamic World constituted a true threat to 
international peace and security, which 
could not be ignored and must be coun-
teracted by adequate measures. Hostile 
perceptions do not only exist in extreme 
right-wing circles, but are spreading across 
the minds of intellectuals, youth, ordinary 
people in all parts of society, leaving peo-
ple in both worlds more and more convin-
ced of the bad faith of the other. Stereo-
types such as the imaginary army of radical 
bomb-throwing Bin Ladens, or the deca-
dent non-believers trying to colonize the 
Islamic World for oil and imperial domina-
tion, are subject to instrumentalization by 
religious and political extremists, who 
themselves firmly believe in their own ste-
reotypes and the rejection of the other. 
The question was raised whether the Al-
liance of Civilizations should be a political 
initiative only, or include also a religious 
dimension. As desirable as it may be lea-
ving religion aside, it was concluded to be 
impossible because religion had de facto 
turned into a political instrument.  
 
17. For some Muslim extremists, the 
“clash of civilizations” provides a most 
welcome support, feeding their belief of 
being warriors of Jihad against the new 
crusades, and facilitating the recruitment 
of followers. Some participants considered 
that the dominance of a globalized neoli-
beral economy was crucial in this respect 
because in many parts of the world it re-
moved the “safety net” provided by states 
which used to give ordinary people shelter 
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by providing basic health, education, ele-
mentary and economic rights. Once remo-
ved that shelter, people find relief in the 
charity and welfare institutions of religious 
organizations, some of them extremist. 
The social and welfare work is precisely 
one of the strongest assets of Islamist orga-
nizations and a way to ensure support and 
recruitment. In some occasions, a similar 
phenomenon has been observed in Chris-
tian extremism. As long as secular forces 
do not take a stand and religious groups 
are the only societal forces which address 
the needs of people, be they social and 
economic needs, or fear and anger vis-à-vis 
imperial foreign occupation, the field is 
left to non-secular forces. It was stressed 
that the question of how to stop the flows 
of recruitment by bringing forward poli-
cies should be at the centre of reflection, 
and that the issue of foreign occupation, 
most particularly in Iraq and Palestine, 
played a major role in this regard.  
 
18. When talking about the need for an 
alliance between civilizations, the notion 
of terrorism as one of the fiercest expres-
sions of the existing confrontation is una-
voidable. Some raised the question whe-
ther the fight against terrorism by the do-
minant Western powers was not the new 
mask of a modern colonialism. According 
to another critical argument, the fact that 
terrorism, as a threat which causes not a 
fraction of the fatalities caused by war, di-
sease and starvation, had been put on top 
of the global agenda gave evidence that 
this agenda was not being set according to 
the objective scale and dimension of the 
threat, but rather according to its target 
group, and according to who had the po-
wer to determine when there is or not an 
urgent need for concerted global action.  
 
19. The phenomenon of terrorism is so 
complex that, for decades, the internatio-
nal community was unable to define it 
properly, and the term keeps on being mi-
sused for other kinds of violence.3 Terro-
                                                 
3 In his report In larger freedom: towards development, security 
and human rights for all, published on 21 March 2005, the UN 
Secretary-General fully endorsed the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change´s call for “a definition of terro-
rism, even though by no means an exclu-
sively modern phenomenon, has today de-
veloped into a large-scale lethal threat 
which at the same time constitutes, illus-
trates and reinforces the confrontation be-
tween Western and Islamic societies. The-
re is nothing by which terrorism can be 
justified. However, in order to be able to 
tackle the problem, the underlying reasons 
behind it must be well understood. Dea-
ling with the root causes and motivations 
of terrorism means trying to resolve the 
Gordian knot, and still it is a much more 
sustainable and therefore promising ap-
proach than trying to tackle the problem 
merely through security measures. Despe-
ration and anger of a long-term suffering 
and injustice from the hands of a powerful 
opponent often provide the fertile ground 
on which extremism and terrorism can 
grow. With regard to the Alliance of Civili-
zations, it was strongly believed that any 
initiative which contributed to successfully 
countering hostile perceptions between 
members of different civilizations would 
also help to stop the violence. 
 
 
 
2.2. THE SELF AND THE OTHER: IDENTITIES 
AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
20. A clear image of the other, as well as of 
one’s own identity, are preconditions for 
recognizing and respecting each other’s 
differences. When talking about an Allian-
ce of Civilizations, who are we talking of? 
What constitutes “the West”? Is there an 
“Arab-Islamic Civilization”, and if so, how 
is it characterized? In accordance with the 
mentioned perceptions, the answers to 
these questions are very different, depen-
ding on which side of the Mediterranean 
one enquires. 
 
21. There was general agreement that a cut 
and dried characterization of either “the 
West” or “the Islamic / Arab World” did 
                                                                         
rism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions al-
ready proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes 
terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm 
to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating 
a population or compelling a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” 
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not do justice to the complexity of either 
of them. Moreover, even if one allowed the 
existence of such civilizations as relatively 
homogeneous entities, by using these 
terms one encounters the practical diffi-
culty of not knowing whom to include. 
Does Israel belong to the West? Does Ja-
pan? Does the “Islamic World” include 
only Arab states or also Far Eastern Islam? 
And where to place Turkey?  
 
22. Historically, the terms “East” and 
“West” arose from the split of the Chris-
tian Church in the Roman Empires of the 
West and East, thus out of a break within 
Christianity, not as a distinction between 
Christians and Muslims. Speaking of an 
“Arab-Muslim World” is per se not accep-
table, because the term is mixing up reli-
gion with ethnicity by equating the re-
ligion of Islam with the Arab ethnic group. 
Such a blend of categories reinforces ste-
reotypes (“All Arabs are Muslims”, “All 
Muslims are Arabs”) and must therefore be 
carefully avoided. The term “Arab World” 
remains extremely limited, while the term 
“Muslim World” appears rather too exten-
sive, especially if one includes not only 
those states where the majority of the po-
pulation is of Muslim confession, but also 
those with a considerable Muslim minori-
ty, which would again include almost all of 
Western Europe. And even if a suitable 
term could be found, given the variety of 
the different forms of Islam as a religion, 
the range of political systems in Arab 
countries, and the many inner-Arab con-
flicts throughout history, it would remain 
daring to speak of this entity as a homoge-
neous block without further differentia-
tion. 
 
23. The quest for an entity called “the 
West”, in order to find a term one can ac-
tually operate with, does not prove much 
easier. Participants especially expressed 
their difficulties in mingling together Eu-
rope and the United States, given the subs-
tantial differences between them. And even 
if one accepted to define the “West” as 
comprising the European Union and the 
United States, and maybe Israel, what 
about Japan, and many other countries? So 
apparently, failing to make up a precise de-
finition, the debate sticks to the West as 
only including the US and the EU only to 
reduce complexity. Despite the general re-
jection of the whole “East-West” termino-
logy for being all too cut and dried and ac-
tually out-dated, the terms kept on being 
used due to the lack of more suitable alter-
natives. 
 
24. In the reflection on what constitutes 
the identity of the West from a Western 
point of view, the current European iden-
tity crisis, illustrated by the paralyzation of 
the Constitutional ratification process, gai-
ned special attention. In fact, one of the 
reasons for the present crisis was seen in 
Europe’s unwillingness to cut the umbili-
cal cord to the United States. The question 
of to what extent the negative referenda in 
France and the Netherlands constituted 
any reliable evidence of the European po-
pulation’s general unhappiness with the 
development of the European Union, or 
even meant the failure of the European 
project, was controversially discussed.  
 
25. The issue of a possible future Turkish 
EU membership was agreed to be greatly 
relevant for the inquiry after the European 
identity. With regard to the present semi-
nar, one participant noted that the fact that 
Turkey was singled out as the only country 
to be assigned a special notion in the pro-
gram of a seminar on the Alliance of Civi-
lizations suggested that “Turkey was trou-
ble”, an attitude which greatly reflected the 
general European posture towards the 
country. At the same time it was admitted 
that as a matter of fact, there were many 
reasonable objections to Turkey’s EU 
membership. Officially, it is a candidature 
like any other, with criteria such as human 
rights and democracy, social-economic de-
velopment, etcetera. However, participants 
largely agreed that in spite of all well-
intended attempts to claim the opposite, 
the main reason why Turkey, unlike Eas-
tern European countries, was not being 
immediately accepted as a future EU mem-
ber state was not its economic or human 
rights situation, but its Muslim identity. 
 
Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada    
 6 
26. Since the country’s possible accession 
has come closer and has thus become a fre-
quent issue of debate, Islam has increa-
singly been seen as an obstacle to EU ac-
cession on both sides. Turkey is a country 
hard to classify; depending on the criteria 
applied, it could be included both in Wes-
tern and in Islamic civilizations. Euro-
peans fear that the presence of millions of 
Muslims might challenge European cul-
tural integrity – a fear that neglects the fact 
that a broad Muslim presence in Europe 
has been a reality for decades. But even 
though such fears are present, there is no 
total majority opposition against Turkey’s 
accession within the EU population. Ne-
vertheless, according to the Turkish per-
ception of the inner-European debate, the 
issue of their country’s accession is seen 
through the “prism of the Christian club”. 
Even though Turkey’s “bridge role” has 
been often exaggerated, it was noted that 
paradoxically, Turkey was probably one of 
the non-European states which most re-
sembled the pattern of a Western Euro-
pean nation-state. But again, by labelling 
Turkey with the emblem of Islam, religion 
and state are mixed up. Participants stres-
sed that, if Europe really understood the 
practical meaning of laïcité, it would not 
be discussing Turkey’s EU accession in 
terms of Islam.  
 
27. The case of Turkey reveals a lot of the 
European identity debate, because the 
central question, whether or not the EU 
can integrate millions of Muslims in their 
midst, ignores the detail that there are al-
ready millions of Muslims living in the 
heart of Europe. Islam in Europe, or Euro-
pean Islam, is not an option but a reality. 
All too often, it was bewailed, Islam is trea-
ted as if it were a problem in itself. In the 
debate on how Islam fits into European so-
cieties, again, the issue of how Europe de-
fines itself is crucial. So far the European 
Union has been stating negatively attribu-
tes which did not form part of the alleged 
European identity, but failed to clearly de-
fine itself positively, and in this sense, Is-
lam has always been a factor of distinction. 
The perception of Islam being an eastern 
religion is so deeply rooted that even after 
four generations, Muslims in Europe are 
denominated as foreigners. The idea that 
Islam might be European, too – and Chris-
tianity Middle Eastern –  does not enter 
into people’s heads, in spite of the obvious 
realities. Muslims in Europe are eternally 
immigrants, and Islam is considered the 
religion of immigrants, thus non-Euro-
pean. How many generations will it take 
European Muslims to be recognized as full 
citizens? There has to be a moment when 
people are granted the label “integrated”, 
meaning European citizens. Multicultura-
lists, who only want to build bridges, and 
only bridges, pave the way for the cons-
truction of walls. 
 
28. The issue of the separation of state and 
religion, laïcité, is of considerable impor-
tance in the immigration debate, but also 
in the interplay of perceptions between 
Western and Muslim countries. The West 
is all too ready to criticise Muslim coun-
tries for their lack of secularism in the pu-
blic sphere. In the Middle East, many peo-
ple found their identity on Islam. A lot of 
political parties have been founded in or-
der to conform politics with Islamic prin-
ciples. Most of these are respectable, but 
some are immeasurably orthodox, and so-
me of them want the religious law (Shari’a) 
to be also a political one. But also in the 
West, even though Christian political par-
ties are essentially secular, protestant mo-
vements – namely in the US – are having a 
great political impact. In this sense, par-
ticipants argued that the West was not en-
titled to praise its own superiority in terms 
of secularity of public space.4  
 
29. We live in an era of a “re-enchantment 
of the world” (Morris Berman), a parallel 
spreading of technology and religion 
through globalisation, through which reli-
gion seems to live a comeback. But the re-
vert to religion is not a return. What re-
turns is not religion, but religious practi-
ces. Globally speaking, there is an increa-
                                                 
4 In the United States, American nationalism is formally secular 
but in fact functioning according to a Biblical archetype, since 
its defenders see themselves as a people with a mission to bring 
salvation to humanity, even if it were by force. 
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sing social pressure to exercise religious 
practices, mostly transmitted by the media 
and boosted by the process of globalisa-
tion, resulting in a “merchandization” of 
religion. American neoliberalism supports 
the revival of religion in the US, but in fact  
it is not a real religious comeback but a 
political recourse to the religious as a 
means to secure imperial dominance. In 
Europe, too, laïcité has not been real. In 
spite of all secularisation throughout his-
tory, the formally secular nationalism has 
maintained a strong underlying sense of 
the religious, which has been often instru-
mentalized to gain and secure power. No-
wadays, discourse in many European 
countries is double-faced: people easily 
claim superiority in terms of laïcité and 
judge Islam, but on the other hand, in con-
venient occasions, it does not bother them 
that religion enters the political sphere. 
 
30. But is there a problem with European 
Islam after all? Today’s difficulties with Is-
lam in Europe are not of a legal or reli-
gious nature. Muslims do not have per se 
any problems with European legislation. 
However, secularisation and laïcité have in 
the Muslim World often been perceived as 
being anti-Islamic. This perception beco-
mes more understandable when looking at 
the different models of imposed seculari-
sation, which left in many countries the 
footprint of secularisation as being anti-
religious, and which has above all served 
as a means to impose autocratic regimes. 
Fortunately, in Western immigrant socie-
ties this perception is today changing. 
Muslims who migrate to the West should 
have a very clear understanding of the 
meaning of secularism, citizenship, etc. 
Europe, on its part, must be very clear and 
coherent as to what are the non-negotiable 
principles of public space. 
 
31. So instead of a true understanding of 
laïcité, there is a great confusion between 
nationality and religion. Frequently, the 
term “Islam” is being used as if it were an 
ethnic group or nationality, while as a mat-
ter of fact it is a religion with a universal 
vocation, not limited to any ethnic, geo-
graphical or linguistic group. Some parti-
cipants noted some kind of hysteria about 
Islam in Western public discourse, with a 
little bit of Islam being mingled in every-
where. At the same time, cultural relati-
vism, which tries to explain terrorism with 
a lack of true understanding of Islam in 
Western societies, thereby establishing a 
direct connection between Islam and terro-
rism, was considered unacceptable. A clear 
distinction of religion, ethnicity and natio-
nality, a real understanding of laïcité, must 
be the basis of any discourse on European 
identity. 
 
32. Even though Islam does not per se 
clash with democratic principles, the Euro-
pean capacity to integrate Muslims in their 
societies is rather decreasing. In European 
collective memory, three chapters of cru-
cial importance for the relationship bet-
ween Europe and the Muslim World are 
practically absent: the memory of the Mus-
lim philosophical heritage (which is cur-
rently reduced to name-dropping), the 
memory of colonialism, and an awareness 
of the contribution of Muslim exile wor-
kers in the context of European recons-
truction. In order to solve the problems of 
the present, public memory must be com-
plete and vivid. For example, unlike in the 
case of Christian philosophy, the establish-
ment of a link between religion and ratio-
nalist philosophy is being categorically 
denied to Islam. This imposed separation 
constitutes an intolerable limitation, and 
ignores the long rational Islamic tradition. 
By denying Muslims the ability to rational 
thinking, they are implicitly denied the 
ability to participate in public debate. Peo-
ple who build the present today have to 
understand that rationality belongs to eve-
ryone and not, as selective memory sug-
gests, to the West only.  
 
33. With regard to the view on Islam in 
Western discourse, a major criticism was 
that the religion of Islam was being treated 
as a monolith, with an image of unvaried 
and inflexible backwardness, while in fact 
it is a religion with many different expres-
sions and with a long tradition of rationa-
list philosophic thinking. The Western dis-
course is characterized by a strong essen-
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tialization of Islam, in the sense that all 
Muslims are being lumped together, in or-
der to facilitate the terms of reference for 
the West. This essentialization constitutes 
a powerful weapon of domination, because 
essentializing the other, presupposing it 
being a monolith immovably caught in the 
status quo, is a violent simplification and 
thereby inferiorization of the other.  
 
34. An example for the essentialization of 
Islam is provided by the current debate on 
democracy and terrorism, and in security 
policy in general, where Islam and terro-
rism are frequently equated with each 
other. In a debate on terrorism, Muslims 
are supposed to talk. In a debate about de-
mocracy, Muslims are supposed to listen. 
The fact that nobody considers the possi-
bility that a European citizen, democrat 
and of Islamic confession, might have so-
mething to contribute to the debate on the 
future of European democracy is very tel-
ling. Terrorism indeed requires a political 
response, but this response cannot consist 
in security policies which institutionalise 
discrimination, racism and a supply of evi-
dence based on a general suspicion. 
 
35. In line with its selective memory, Eu-
rope fails to remember that the Greek-La-
tin heritage has led to a break in the Me-
diterranean, and to an expulsion of the Je-
wish-Arab heritage, the Arab origins of Eu-
ropean culture, our “forgotten heritage” 
(Alain de Libera). It was repeatedly stres-
sed that, in the context of the Alliance of 
Civilizations, Spain would be perfectly sui-
ted to move the northern Mediterranean 
towards a re-appropriation of its Jewish-
Arab heritage. This heritage is of particular 
significance for the civilizational dialogue, 
because it proves, once more, that neither 
civilization can be seen as a stereotyped 
single block, since there has been a long 
history of mutual influence and exchange. 
Moreover, it was emphasized that “al-An-
dalus” as a symbol of tolerance and tri-cul-
tural and religious coexistence very well 
reflected the idea of the Alliance of Civi-
lizations.  
 
36. Some Spanish participants expressed 
their view that, despite the positive chapter 
of al-Andalus, taking into account most of 
the rest of Spanish history up to the pre-
sent, Spain could not possibly serve as a 
good example as the “country of dialogue” 
between cultures and civilizations. In addi-
tion, they stressed the general importance 
of avoiding mystification, and to rather fo-
cus on finding solutions for the present 
and the future rather than dwell too much 
on the past in the sense of historical revi-
sionism. Al-Andalus and the Jewish-Arab 
heritage must not be neglected, but neither 
mystified.  
 
37. The crisis of identity is by no means an 
exclusive matter of the West. The issue of 
identity in the Arab-Muslim World is a 
pressing question in many ways, especially 
in relation to the development of Islam 
and its traumatic clash with modernity. 
There are problems in today’s Umma, but 
these religious issues are not to be discus-
sed by Christian or Jewish interlocutors, 
but must be discussed between Muslims, 
in the Muslim World.  
 
38. During the colonial era, a sensation 
had emerged in the progressive parts of Is-
lamic societies that, compared to the West, 
they had somewhat stayed behind. Inde-
pendence movements were founded whose 
aim was to lead their societies into the mo-
dern era and enable them to compete with 
the West on an equal foot. They appealed 
to religion in order to gather support, but 
were opposed by the traditionalist clerics, 
who rather thought Islamic societies were 
behind for not having pursued religious 
principles strictly enough. Thus the key to 
salvation was believed to be found in the 
fundamental principles of Islam. Among 
the militant subgroups there was by that 
time a sensation that they had reached a 
historical moment in which their religion 
suffered an attack by the West, whose se-
cularism had turned their societies profane 
and decadent, and was thus the one to bla-
me for the loss of the Golden Age of the Is-
lamic Empires.  
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39. However, during the same period, the-
re was also a strong exchange of knowled-
ge and ideas between the two civilizations, 
through scholars, embassies, and travel-
lers. In fact, contrary to a frequent Wes-
tern belief, the Muslim World has never 
been sealed-off, not to the Enlightenment, 
not to the World Wars, and nor is it today. 
The Muslim youth, participants argued, 
knows perfectly well what is going on in 
the West; so rather, one should be worried 
about the lack of knowledge in the domi-
nant Western countries.  
 
40. Today it is an acknowledged fact that 
the achievements of medieval Muslim 
scholars built the bridge that connected 
Hellenism with Renaissance. To the degree 
that Europe and the New World progres-
sed, the era of science in the Islamic World 
declined. Four schools of Islamic jurispru-
dence represented by that time different 
interpretations of Islamic Law. The more 
liberal Ulema favoured independent reaso-
ning and the effort to reach consensus, 
whilst the orthodox condemned these libe-
ral interpretations. The latter won the 
struggle, and in the 14th century, the clerics 
declared the doors of Ijtihad (independent 
interpretation of Islamic Law by Muslim 
scholars) closed − a decisive moment in 
which a big paving stone closed up the de-
velopment of Muslim rationalism and con-
troversy.  
 
41. As a consequence of this development, 
as well as of the colonial domination, ma-
ny Islamic societies remain in relative stag-
nation up until today. They are drowned 
in a decidedly unequal relation of power 
especially with the West. Domestically, 
they are often incapable of providing their 
youth the education and opportunities to 
empower them, and in many cases, they 
cannot even provide employment and the 
most basic social services their people 
need. 
 
42. But all these frustrations in Islamic so-
cieties alone cannot explain the authentic 
lethal threat that has undeniably emerged. 
As mentioned above, the rise of terrorism 
is often rooted in desperation and anger of 
a long-term suffering and injustice from 
the hands of a powerful opponent, espe-
cially under foreign occupation. Crucial in 
this respect is the issue of Palestine. The 
daily suffering and humiliation of the Pa-
lestine people are transmitted on TV and 
inflame the hearts and minds of Muslims 
worldwide. The same is true for Israelis 
and Palestinian suicide bombers. Some 
participants argued that, the atrocities on 
both sides are the result of an occupation 
protracted for almost forty years, and will 
not stop before there is an agreement to 
guarantee security in Israel and a viable 
independent Palestinian state. Besides, one 
should not forget that the Palestinians res-
ponsible for the attacks also consider 
themselves as a legitimate armed resistance 
group, although they are labelled “terro-
rists” by others.  
 
43. The presence of Western troops in Af-
ghanistan is another factor fostering re-
sentment in the Islamic World. The 9/11 
attacks were so severe that they did not 
leave the US any other choice than to over-
throw the Taliban regime. For Taliban 
supporters and al-Qaeda, the presence of 
Western troops equals a continuation of 
the 80´s Soviet occupation. Likewise, the 
presence of Western troops in Saudi-Ara-
bia was another source of anti-Western 
resentment, especially with the country 
being the guardian of Islam’s two holiest 
shrines. 
 
44. Finally and perhaps most importantly, 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq has 
left in Muslim societies the conviction of 
Islam being an objective of Western ag-
gression. In addition, people all around the 
world are extremely angry about the sanc-
tions imposed on Iraq that let half a mil-
lion children under five years old die. Ho-
wever, Saddam’s dictatorship and his inva-
sions of Muslim countries (Iran, Kuwait), 
are hardly being taken into account. Ins-
tead, the foreign occupation of Iraq is 
being compared to the occupation of Pa-
lestine. The Iraq issue is clearly becoming 
part of the confrontation between Islam 
and the West, and provides a great source 
of inspiration for al-Qaeda and other mili-
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tant groups, who see in Iraq another hot 
spot for their Jihad. 
 
45. On top of all this, the revealed torture 
of prisoners by Western guards such as in 
Abu Ghraib undermines the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the West which prea-
ches democracy and human rights while at 
the same time spurning them. The impact 
of these terrifying acts on the symbolic le-
vel is substantial, since it plainly confirms 
the Muslim perception of the West, and es-
pecially of the demon USA, nourishing a 
particular hostility against Islam.  
 
46. In order to stop violence in the Middle 
East, it was considered that the most ur-
gent things for the West to do was to end 
the American occupation of Iraq, and to 
put massive pressure on Israel to grant Pa-
lestinians their rights. With regard to the 
latter, scepticism was expressed that the 
political weight American Protestantism 
had under the Bush administration, rather 
showed an America that would most likely 
support Israel unconditionally in its conti-
nued colonialism. Civilizations can close 
up intellectually as an act of resistance. 
The longer these situations continue wit-
hout a viable political solution, the more 
the mutual hostilities among the civiliza-
tions will grow, and the more recruits al-
Qaeda and other extremist organizations 
will get. 
 
47. One participant expressed astonish-
ment on the relative absence of two as-
pects in the present debate: on the one 
hand, why only so few mentioned Guan-
tánamo and the embarrassment before this 
action of an allegedly free and democratic 
country such as the US which on top clai-
med moral superiority. And on the other 
hand, in more general terms, why nobody 
mentioned that the Muslim World should 
also make an effort to earn itself the trust 
of those members of other civilizations 
with good faith? 
 
48. Looking at how negative perceptions 
in both civilizations are created and nou-
rished, the role of public political debate 
and especially the mass media was strongly 
emphasized. In the seminar there was ge-
neral agreement that in both civilizations, 
people live in an atmosphere which was 
denominated “ideology of fear”: a wanted 
strategy to make people fear the other and 
maintain conflictive perceptions. In Euro-
pe, fear is mostly directed towards immi-
gration and terrorism, and creates a local 
suspicion which itself nourishes those po-
litical problems that seem to confirm Islam 
being a threat in itself. This fear is created 
in part by the emotionality that dominates 
the debate. Political forces try to keep this 
emotionality as negative as possible with 
regard to Islam, in order to keep up the 
fear, which they deliberately instrumenta-
lize for political ends. Most surprisingly, 
this very questionable kind of political agi-
tation is not even necessarily being ques-
tioned as a legitimate political tool; one 
participant noted that even the renowned 
sociologist Anthony Giddens had recently 
stated at the UK House of Lords that at 
certain times in history, it was necessary to 
create cultural fear.  
 
49. The strategic use of such an ideology 
of fear has been a very important tool of 
the Bush administration, both domestically 
and internationally. Most importantly, this 
fear has successfully been used to boaster 
acquiescence and support for the so-called 
“war on terror”. However, it was expressed 
that the Western fear had a very strong ra-
cist element. The fact that, in the Euro-
pean context, nobody feared white Bosnian 
Muslims but only ethnic non-Europeans, 
gave evidence that actually it was not a 
fear of Islam in European societies, but 
fear of Arabs, an expression of the old fear 
of the different and the unknown which al-
ways constitutes a key component of ra-
cism. Paradoxically, the uninformed peo-
ple in the US and Europe probably know 
more about Islam than about Confucia-
nism or Buddhism, which shows again that 
the fear used to foster the present religious 
antagonism has its roots not only in cultu-
re or religion but also in racism.  
 
50. Similar patterns of fear of the unknown 
in the population, with political forces 
creating and deliberately nourishing fear 
  Alliance of Civilizations.  
  International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy 
  Seminar Conclusions 
 11
for political ends, can be observed in Isla-
mic and Arab societies. It was expressed 
that in both civilizations, the ideology of 
fear was fostered by extremists, Islamic as 
well as Christian, so that one of the main 
threats consisted not in Islam or Christia-
nity, but in the dangers inherent to reli-
gious fundamentalism in general, which 
countering must be the main aim of an 
Alliance of Civilizations. 
 
51. Within Western societies, the descri-
bed ideology of fear leads to several conse-
quences. Firstly, ideas that until recently 
had been stigmatised as belonging to extre-
me right-wing discourse, are now adopted 
and advocated by classical conservative 
discourse and thereby made acceptable, a 
development which is very dangerous. 
Secondly, it reinforces the fear of a loss of 
cultural uniformity/ integrity in Europe. In 
many European countries, Muslims were 
first told to integrate, and once they have 
done so, they are explicitly being distin-
guished, since their integration might put 
in danger the cultural uniformity of the 
country. This is a very subtle and dange-
rous discourse, bordering racism.  
 
52. Finally, the ideology of fear has an im-
pact in the field of citizenship. As mentio-
ned above, Muslims must do much more 
than others to prove they are genuine citi-
zens. This leads to the emergence of a rela-
tionship between state and citizen which is 
not based on trust, but on control. Citizens 
of Muslim confession may be tolerated, but 
are not valued as equal, because people 
cannot imagine that a Muslim citizen can 
be completely and fully part of their socie-
ty. Instead, control is exercised over what 
they do. But citizenship is per definitionem 
not attached to religion or ethnicity, but is 
a personal choice, an exercise of personal 
freedom to adopt the rights and duties of a 
society.  
 
53. In a general view on identities and per-
ceptions in Arab and Islamic societies and 
the West, the most central issue was con-
sidered to be the lack of genuine informa-
tion and knowledge of each other, which 
form the basis for all distorted perceptions. 
Both civilizations were asserted to have 
stereotyped images of the other, and that 
religion, as well as imperial dominance in 
the past and present, played important 
roles in this regard. It was emphasized that 
those stereotypes must be cleaned up 
through massive means, and that the cul-
ture of confrontation arising from it must 
be counteracted. An Alliance of Civiliza-
tions which managed some impact in this 
regard would be a very valuable contribu-
tion. 
 
 
 
2.3. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 
MULTILATERALISM AND COSMOPOLITAN 
DEMOCRACY 
 
54. Beyond the idea of what constitutes the 
self and the other, resentment and hosti-
lities between nations and civilizations 
might also be created by some more tan-
gible disagreements regarding the way the 
current international system is designed 
and operated. Particularly in the weaker 
countries, resentment is increasing to the 
degree that the powerful take advantage of 
their superiority to dominate the way the 
international economy, peace and security 
and other global issues are being dealt 
with, according to their national or regio-
nal interests, thereby contradicting the ve-
ry idea of the United Nations. Controver-
sial issues in this regard which were dis-
cussed during the present seminar include 
the call for multilateralist solutions (espe-
cially in the context of UN Reform), the 
development and enforcement of Interna-
tional Law, and the promotion of demo-
cratic values, including human rights. 
 
55. The current system of global gover-
nance, institutionally represented by the 
United Nations, starts from the principle 
that any threat to global security must be 
dealt with on the grounds of multilateral 
decision-making. However, with the US 
left as the only superpower, politically, 
economically and militarily highly supe-
rior to any other, the multilateral system 
faces the difficulty of enforcement of Inter-
national Law vis-à-vis an invincible power, 
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which is naturally tempted to submit its 
sovereignty under the rule of the UN only 
where it matches its interests.  
 
56. The United States today takes advan-
tage of its unique position in a selective 
application of values, in particular related 
to what is declared the universal value of 
democracy. The United States, it was ex-
pressed, imposed on the world their rules, 
challenging International Law and the Uni-
ted Nations, down-playing the role and 
significance of the UN. Nevertheless, in 
sixty years of its existence, the UN had ne-
ver been more relevant than when it stood 
up against Washington and said “No” to 
war. 
 
57. To the extent the US applies unilateral 
ad hoc solutions, instead of leaving the 
task of managing global governance and 
particularly peace and security to the UN, 
anger is generated in the rest of the world. 
Particularly those who are target of US 
unilateral action and lack the strength to 
counteract, are filled with indignation be-
fore the absence of effective mechanisms 
to implement multilateral solutions and 
the impotence of the global community 
and especially the UN, which is supposed 
to be safeguarding the rights of the wea-
kest. The most significant case in point is 
the unilateral US invasion of Iraq, which 
was not backed up by the UN Security 
Council and thus illegal under Interna-
tional Law. 
 
58. The invasion of Iraq provoked the mo-
bilization of civil society around the globe, 
of people on the streets saying “No” to 
war, disgusted at the US’ single-handed 
action. Even though this was not the first 
time anti-war demonstrations were held, 
governments around the world were for-
ced to listen in a collective and collabora-
tive manner. Due to the global scope of 
protests, powerful governments could pro-
vide a kind of political backing for the 
smaller ones, a group called the “Uncom-
mitted Six”5, six countries each of them 
too weak to oppose the US on its own. To-
                                                 
5 Cameroon, Guinea, Angola, Pakistan, Mexico and Chile. 
gether, backed by larger, more powerful 
countries, they were able to provide the 
core of a governmental challenge to Was-
hington’s drive towards unilateral war. 
How was that possible? Because people in 
the streets massively demanded it, so at so-
me point the price governments would ha-
ve had to pay for giving in to Washington 
turned higher than the price for saying no 
and standing up against the US as a part of 
the global resistance movement. Even 
though this opposition of the masses this 
time was not enough to prevent unilateral 
military action, it illustrated the power of 
the people and showed that, where there is 
union, an opposition against a single su-
perpower’s unilateralism can have an im-
pact.  
 
59. The distribution of power and effective 
multilateralism are central issues within 
the ongoing process of UN Reform. How 
can the United Nations be consolidated as 
a reference point for effectively safeguar-
ding global peace and security, based on 
multilateral decision-making? Again, one 
faces the dilemma of how such a reform 
can possibly be adopted with the consent 
of the only superpower if it aims to force 
that very superpower under the rule of 
law. Some participants emphatically un-
derlined the need that the world reclaimed 
what the UN charter stands for, that the 
global community’s interests must not be 
driven by the powerful, but by all. In this 
sense, the unique opportunity of the pro-
cess of UN Reform must be taken advan-
tage of to make multilateralism accounta-
ble to stand up even to superpowers. 
 
60. Is this a feasible aim? A talk about re-
form is a talk about power, is a talk about 
the Security Council, which up to today is 
so often the representative of the strongest, 
as well as of the least democratic agents of 
the UN. Participants considered that in 
theory, a reasonable reform of the Security 
Council would have to abolish the veto 
and expand the Council in order to make 
it a truly representative organ. In practice, 
a more realistic proposal to make the Se-
curity Council accountable was seen in the 
creation of an oversight panel, composed 
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not of country representatives but of indi-
viduals, influential jurists foremost in In-
ternational Law, to ensure that Security 
Council decisions did not themselves vio-
late International Law.  
 
61. Moreover, there must be a shift of po-
wer from the Security Council to the Ge-
neral Assembly. Legally, according to the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, when the Se-
curity Council is paralysed for any reason 
– which could be a veto, or threat of it – 
the General Assembly is authorized to take 
up issues that ordinarily would only be 
allowed to be taken up in the Council.6 
There are ways the General Assembly can 
reclaim power to reflect the interests of the 
non-powerful. The run-up to the Iraq war, 
even though it did not stop the war in the 
end, already gave an idea of how that 
could work. 
 
62. Some wondered whether the very call 
for an Alliance of Civilizations was not a 
proof that the project of the United Na-
tions, founded in 1949 as a true Union of 
Nations, had failed, for not being able to 
conduct a global policy that safeguarded 
national politics by placing itself above it. 
In response, it was admitted that in some 
ways, the UN had failed to fulfil its object-
tives, and thus the Alliance of Civilizations 
should contribute to its renewal. On the 
other hand, people argued that the huge 
efforts and achievements made by the UN 
in some fields, e.g. in the Palestine issue, 
had been too often neglected. Moreover, it 
was not a failure inherent to the UN if its 
members lacked the common sense to ap-
ply laws and agreements. The UN, it was 
argued, had its strengths and weaknesses, 
and among its strengths, UN action in the 
field of humanitarian intervention and the 
development of the rule of law were men-
tioned. The necessary UN Reform, partici-
pants added, must not be reduced to “sla-
shing budget and firing staff”, but instead 
be a reform aimed at openness, democrati-
sation, transparency, and broadening to in-
clude civil society. 
                                                 
6 UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V): Uniting for peace, 
03.11.1950. 
63. Some participants argued that even if it 
was viable to establish a true multilatera-
lism, it would not suffice to satisfy con-
temporary requirements. Multilateralism, 
it was argued, included only governments 
in the decision-making process, so what 
was needed for a democratic global gover-
nance was a system based on a new kind of 
multi-levelled “internationalism”, invol-
ing the UN as both actor and venue, na-
tional governments, as well as the most 
important non-state actors of civil society, 
in order to challenge the whole range of 
issues relevant to global governance.  
 
64. The hard end of multilateralism is the 
enforcement of International Law. Multila-
teralism can only be effective if Interna-
tional Law is applied universally. However, 
due to the current distribution of power, 
there are in practice different measures for 
the US and for the rest of the world. UN 
Resolutions are being applied or not de-
pending on whose interests are affected by 
the envisaged actions. This insufferable hy-
pocrisy, participants criticized, was under-
mining the credibility of the UN as an im-
partial global intermediary. As a matter of 
fact, International Law is currently in a ve-
ry precarious situation. The system opens 
no space for an opposition of the weakest 
to the most powerful, in case the latter de-
cide not to stick to the rules. 
 
65. Why is this so? Since the Middle Ages, 
the world has been organized in political 
communities around the principle of sove-
reignty, first monarchs, then nation states. 
With the development of military techno-
logy, wars between sovereign European 
states reached a level of violence which, af-
ter two World Wars, led to the founding of 
the UN as a system of global harmoniza-
tion on the basis of a common law. Parallel 
to that, sovereignty, which had been the 
symbol of the majesty of power and the 
independence of people, became the object 
of desire of the people in the colonized 
territories, and their elites imitated the po-
litical form of the sovereign state in the 
20th century process of decolonisation in a 
universal extension. Sovereignty thereby 
became the basic principle of International 
Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada    
 14 
Law, guaranteed by the UN charter (art. 2 
par. 1). 
 
66. The principle of sovereignty of the sta-
te still forms the basis of contemporary In-
ternational Law. Sovereignty means the ex-
clusiveness of competences on a specific 
territory, itself or by delegation. It is by de-
finition unlimited, which must naturally 
lead to a clash of different national sove-
reignties. The principle of sovereignty is 
characterized by a strong inherent ambi-
guity: on the one hand, the sovereign is 
entitled to administer the national law, 
which constitutes a guarantee of the rights 
of its citizens. On the other hand, the in-
conditionality of sovereignty is susceptible 
to instrumentalization. This leads to an 
erosion of International Law, turning sove-
reignty from an instrument for the pro-
tection of the weak into a tool of the most 
powerful.  
 
67. On this ground, International Justice 
must remain weak. The ICC and the ICJ 
do not have the power to summon anyone 
without the consent of the home state, and 
their judgements often stay without prac-
tical consequences. Moreover, the incondi-
tionality of sovereignty implies the risk 
that the rule of law, human rights and 
other democratic principles may be under-
mined any moment by a return to the state 
of emergency as the very last resort of the 
sovereign. An example is the US “Patriot 
Act”, which constitutes a considerable res-
triction of human rights and civil liberties 
in the name of protection.  
 
68. The inconditionality of power inherent 
to the principle of sovereignty makes the 
limitation of the stronger sovereignties, by 
law or legal procedures, impossible. But 
transnational relations need a legal frame, 
of which the source cannot be the states 
themselves. It is true that sovereignty is a 
constitutive element in the definition of 
democracy. But the difficulty to maintain 
multilateralism in a world with an imba-
lanced distribution of power shows that on 
a global level, it is in fact the limitation of 
(national) sovereignty that guarantees de-
mocracy. 
69. Contemporary International Law is a 
voluntary law, in essence a contradiction, 
meaning that those who choose to subs-
cribe to it voluntarily submit their sove-
reignty under its rule. In legal terms, laws 
are an expression of general will and/or 
values, and obligatory for all. “Internatio-
nal Law”, however, is based on contracts, a 
tool of interindividual relations on the le-
vel of the signatories. Consequently, Inter-
national Law is relative, not absolute, and 
no binding rule can be imposed on the so-
vereign state to which the very has not 
subscribed (except, indirectly, through po-
litical pressure). Hence, on the global le-
vel, there is actually no “law” in the above 
mentioned sense.  
 
70. The big international conventions, 
which were meant to provide a framework 
for international society, are ratified only 
by those states which are in favour of its 
requirements, without any legal obligation. 
There is no reference law, and no judge 
automatically competent, so there is a 
great space in which the contract partners 
can fully exercise their interplay of forces, 
to the disadvantage of the weak. Moreover, 
what we call today external constraints na-
turally weigh heavier on the weak than on 
the strong states. This leads in practice to a 
hierarchy between the states, a system ru-
led by the survival of the fittest. At the sa-
me time, there are no universal norms to 
balance these inequalities, and to fight all 
the pressing problems which fall under the 
duty of global governance. This situation 
naturally fosters the anger of the weakest. 
 
71. So what is to be done? The erosion of 
International Law must be faced through 
the corresponding improvement in synthe-
sis, but above all in application. The con-
text of UN Reform, and especially the Se-
curity Council, provides a unique opportu-
nity to clean up these disparities and esta-
blish rules and procedures to guarantee 
democracy and the rule of law also on a 
global level, without depending solely on 
the good will of sovereign states. Given the 
weakening effect the concept of sovereign-
ty has on the regime of multilateralism, its 
significance as a basis of contemporary In-
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ternational Law should at least be revie-
wed, and eventually adjusted. In general 
terms, a redefinition of values on an inter-
national level is needed, plus the corres-
ponding mechanisms to ensure its applica-
tion. However, as long as there is no such 
set of genuine, complete rules for demo-
cratic global governance, the existing ones 
must be applied. 
 
72. The call for a redefinition of globally 
applicable principles leads to the question 
of the universality of democratic values. As 
mentioned above, the credibility of a coun-
try’s efforts to promote democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law throughout the 
world depends on the integrity and cohe-
rence that a nation demonstrates itself in 
the application of the corresponding va-
lues. Since such efforts are based on the 
belief of democracy as a universal value, it 
is paradox that apparently, to the degree 
national sovereignty is being touched, this 
claimed universality seems not to apply to 
the only level where a truly universal dis-
persion of these principles can be promo-
ted: globally.  
 
73. The dominant nations, participants ar-
gued, must therefore not be surprised if 
their noble quest to bring the good to the 
world is not being met with the expected 
enthusiasm, since they foil their own cre-
dibility in this field by not applying uni-
versally themselves what they claim to be a 
universal value when it fits their interest. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn 
from this double-faced discourse, it was 
expressed, is that not a serious commit-
ment with democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law stands behind the powerful 
countries’ democratisation efforts, but the 
attempt to bring about conditions favoura-
ble to their own political, economical and 
geostrategic interests, under the disguise of 
nobility. 
 
74. Democratisation efforts entail a certain 
“democratic paradox” (Huntington): per-
mitting genuine democracy throughout the 
world includes a risk to get regimes hostile 
to one’s own interests. In this sense, most 
participants did not believe the West and 
especially the US to be seriously commit-
ted to democracy. Some participants from 
Arab countries argued that people in the 
Arab World wanted indeed democracy, but 
while the West did not take its commit-
ment to democratic values seriously, neit-
her could they.  
 
75. Good governance is rule-based deci-
sion-making through transparent institu-
tions which are representative of the peo-
ple at large. Anything else leads to a con-
centration of power and a marginalization 
of the masses. In this sense, the current 
global multilateral system is exercising bad 
governance. The concept of “cosmopolitan 
democracy”7 describes democracy as a tru-
ly universal regime, not only applicable 
within states but also on the regional and 
global spheres, between states and interna-
tional organizations. This implies that de-
mocracy needs to be understood with cer-
tain flexibility, that there is not only one 
model of democracy that can be applied at 
all levels. And above all, it implies that the 
old notion of sovereignty needs to be re-
placed by some “constitutionalism”, mea-
ning that all actors of political life have to 
be integrated into some constitutional sys-
tem, so democratic principles are obligato-
ry not only within states, but also between 
states and within international organiza-
tions. 
 
76. The current US administration, it was 
argued, referred only to democracy on an 
inner state level. It permitted itself to de-
termine how other states have to design 
their democracies, and showed no inclina-
tion to follow the rules of democracy on a 
transnational level. This was considered an 
anti-ethical program, based on a schizo-
phrenic understanding of democracy: in-
ternal democracy, external free style. But 
democracy as a universal value cannot be 
applied selectively. 
 
77. In the promotion of democracy, there 
must be a consistency between means and 
ends. Democracy means also the rule of 
                                                 
7 See Daniele Archibugi and David Held (Eds.): Cosmopolitan 
Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge 
Polity Press, 1995. 
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law, and consequently, democracy cannot 
be imported by breaking the law. Neither 
can democracy be imported where it is not 
wanted and there are no societal forces to 
preserve it. For example, the fundamental 
difference between the liberation of Italy in 
1945 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was 
that in Italy, the Americans stopped the 
war started by the fascist government, whi-
le in Iraq, it was the Americans who star-
ted the war. Whilst the former was a true 
and welcome liberation, the latter was an 
aggression. But aggression is no political 
option to promote democracy.  
 
78. In terms of human rights, it was be-
moaned that the effective protection of hu-
man rights still depended on the good will 
of the states. An Alliance of Civilizations 
committed to human rights was seen con-
fronted with two choices: either provide a 
rather limp reference point for human 
rights without explicit effort in this area, 
or fundamentally claim the primacy of hu-
man rights and International Humanita-
rian Law. Given the already mentioned in-
coherence in the application of human 
rights, democratic principles and Interna-
tional Law in general, an explicit notion of 
the primacy of International Human Rights 
Law was considered necessary in order to 
secure the basic human rights of every-
body and defend their universal validity 
against cultural relativism. In the context 
of the Alliance of Civilizations, as well as 
of UN Reform, it was demanded to treat 
civil and political, economical, social, and 
cultural rights as a non-negotiable socket 
of law – be it called international republi-
can law, common patrimony of human-
kind, or other – as a whole, single block 
which enjoys explicit primacy. A simple 
reference to those rights, it was repeatedly 
emphasized, is not enough if the universal 
application of human rights is to be se-
cured. 
 
79. Against the background of all these 
challenges, how must such an Alliance of 
Civilizations be designed in order to make 
a valuable contribution to tackling  them? 
 
 
3. Implications and Ideas for a 
Tangible Alliance of 
Civilizations 
 
80. One of the immediate reactions to the 
idea to form an Alliance of Civilizations 
was a certain doubt on whether and in 
which way this Alliance would provide an 
added value to the field of already existing 
initiatives aimed at building bridges and 
establishing ties between different coun-
tries, peoples and cultures (e.g. Iranian 
President Khatami’s Dialogue of Civiliza-
tions). Especially in the Mediterranean, gi-
ven that several similar activities have al-
ready been implemented in that region 
(Forum for the Future, EuroMed Part-
nership, European Neighbourhood Policy, 
etc.), there might be a certain danger of 
duplication, further adding to what is al-
ready a rather confusing array of initia-
tives. 
 
81. In response, it was stressed that the 
main virtue of the Alliance of Civilizations 
in comparison to other, similar initiatives 
was that it did not remain in getting to 
know each other in order to overcome ste-
reotypes and mutual hostility, but that it 
aimed at urging concrete measures of com-
mon action beyond simple exchange. This 
difference, it was stated, was also perceived 
at the UN Headquarters, and had even 
been recognized by initiators of other ini-
tiatives, like the aforementioned Dialogue 
of Civilizations. The Alliance of Civiliza-
tions will be a long-term initiative which 
aims to go beyond any other initiative 
which has advanced, but maybe not mana-
ged to mobilize universal conscience. The 
Dialogue of Civilizations has opened a 
door but has been practically exhausted, so 
now it is time to start a new impulse with a 
different strategy. Moreover, the Dialogue 
of Civilizations is limited to the framework 
of the UNESCO, while the envisaged fra-
mework for the Alliance of Civilizations is 
the whole UN.  
 
82. A major criticism regarding the pro-
posal to form an Alliance of Civilizations 
consisted in it being still too vague and 
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lacking substance in terms of concrete 
ideas. In the present seminar, a broad de-
bate lead by the explicit desire to generate 
such tangible ideas and give substance to 
the Alliance of Civilizations, treated se-
mantic questions, actors involved, scope of 
action, and possible fields of activity. 
 
83. First of all, the very term “Alliance of 
Civilizations” was being challenged as a ti-
tle for the present proposal. Among the 
immediate criticisms to the Alliance of Ci-
vilizations initiative was the argument that 
the term “alliance”, unlike “dialogue” or 
“cooperation”, had a conflictive connota-
tion, implying there was a confrontation 
with an enemy against whom allies must 
be sought. Some participants found the 
term “Alliance among Civilizations” more 
suitable for the envisaged undertaking 
than “Alliance of Civilizations” because 
the former described better the element of 
cross-fertilization, cosmopolitanism, and 
the idea of a shared process in which none 
of the partners must sacrifice its cultural 
integrity. Others argued that the term 
“Alliance among Civilizations” turned that 
alliance into a self-fulfilling prophecy by 
conveying the message that the alliance 
was urgently needed due to existing con-
flicts, a message which might provoke a 
boomerang-effect. Again, others took the 
posture that the term “Alliance of Civili-
zations” should not be dwelt on too aca-
demically, since they considered the idea 
behind it perfectly comprehensible wit-
hout a need for semantic adjustments.  
 
84. One participant defined the term 
“alliance” as different components finding 
each other on a certain subject and wor-
king together in order to achieve a com-
mon goal. In this sense, it was argued that 
the formula “Alliance of Civilizations” 
missed a definition of its common ground, 
the very goal towards which that alliance 
had been formed. It was therefore sug-
gested to call the initiative after its goals 
rather than after its participants, concre-
tising which values the Alliance stands for 
(e.g. “Alliance for Democracy, Peace and 
Sustainable Development”, “Alliance a-
gainst the recruitment of extremism”). The 
term “alliance” itself was mostly seen as 
very suitable to name the envisaged initia-
tive, since it described the political notion 
of a partnership with common goals, inte-
rests, and challenges. 
 
85. No consensus could be reached as to 
what might be a suitable definition of the 
term “civilization”, despite its being exces-
sively used. Hence, several participants 
were in favour of dropping the term, since 
it allowed for too many interpretations. Ci-
vilizations, it was argued, are a construct 
with no body, no address and no represen-
tatives; a blurred character which paved 
the way for an instrumentalization of the 
term. The term “culture”, which described 
a different concept, did not provide a sui-
table alternative either, and the frequent, 
misleading use of both terms as synonyms 
especially after 9/11 was bewailed. One ar-
gument against the use of both terms in a 
UN context was founded in a certain fear 
that these terms, with their unclear, blur-
red meaning, might infiltrate International 
Law, an option which was seen out of 
question since countries were not to be 
grouped by culture or religion.  
 
86. Moreover, it was expressed that the 
term “civilization” recalled the Biblical ar-
chetype of good and bad, and the 19th-
century nationalist fanatism transposed by 
colonialism. The question was raised whet-
her the aforementioned, old-fashioned no-
tion of civilization as the opposite of bar-
barism was no longer valid in the sense 
that in every civilization today, there re-
mained a seed to go back to barbarism in a 
new form (as illustrated by the many wars 
and conflicts), and whether in this sense, 
the Alliance of Civilizations must not sym-
bolize our conviction that the very “value 
of civilization” must be conserved as a 
defence against the threat of the resurgen-
ce of barbarism in our societies, in order to 
build and defend a humanistic global so-
ciety, capable of integration, instead of 
marginalizing any of its social elements. 
 
87. As mentioned above, civilizations were 
seen as rather blurred entities with no 
official representatives. So who can be the 
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agents of this Alliance of Civilizations? 
The debate about who should be the main 
actors involved in the corresponding acti-
vities mainly circled around the issue of 
how to involve systematically not only 
governments and the United Nations, but 
also civil society. It was argued that on the 
governmental level, there was already a 
sort of alliance of civilizations in place, in 
the sense of the US and EU being in allian-
ces with the leaders of the Arab World. 
Where there was no alliance so far was in 
terms of the population, so what we nee-
ded was an “alliance from below”. This 
alliance would not replace or run against 
the existing alliance between governments, 
but provide a democratic counterbalance 
to it at a global level. While some parts of 
the plenary strongly supported this idea, 
others sceptically added that a general 
consensus from below would imply the 
existence of a universal morality, which 
would still remain to be defined, and by 
whom? The question whether the UN 
could provide a suitable framework for 
such an alliance from below, taking into 
account that this idea went beyond what 
had so far been the main nature of that 
organization, remained unanswered. 
 
88. In the debate on the actors to be in-
volved, there was broad consensus that 
both governments and civil society must 
play an important role in the initiative. 
Without the firm will and power of go-
vernments to apply present initiatives, pro-
posals and demands of civil society, no 
change will be possible. Of course, an ade-
quate civil society representation is crucial, 
otherwise governments would remain the 
principal agents and there would be no 
change compared to the status quo. There 
was general agreement that a powerful 
alliance among civil society could not be 
formed without involving the powerful, 
that is, the elites, and that an Alliance of 
Civilizations as a voluntary exercise by ci-
vil society only would not lead to great 
things, so governments must be involved.  
 
89. In principle there was consensus that 
the Alliance of Civilizations must be an 
initiative in which governments, the Uni-
ted Nations and civil society worked to-
gether hand in hand. However, a major 
challenge was seen in how this idea could 
be translated in practical terms so it ac-
tually reached the people at the local level. 
For this aim it was considered crucial that 
the Alliance be provided with an institu-
tional structure which went beyond cur-
rent government-based models and allo-
wed the systematic involvement of civil so-
ciety on an equal foot. It was underlined 
that in the present seminar, a special ses-
sion had explicitly been dedicated to civil 
society because one of the singularities of 
the Alliance of Civilizations proposal, 
compared to other initiatives, was precise-
ly to mobilize the people, and to ensure 
the participation of the organized civil 
society. 
 
90. The idea of the creation of a forum si-
milar to a “World Parliament” was raised, 
which was in theory considered a useful 
instrument for an Alliance of Civilizations 
to get to know the interests, needs and 
opinions, as well as the disagreements, 
among the forces of society. At the same 
time it was, in this form, admitted to be an 
utopian idea, but still the hope was ex-
pressed that some similar, less far-reaching 
measures could be taken, such as strength-
hening the Interparlamentarian Union, the 
World Social Forum and the UN General 
Assembly, and establishing the Millennium 
Assembly of civil society as a permanent 
institution. Generally, the need for an ins-
titutionalised and powerful role of civil 
society in the Alliance of Civilizations gai-
ned special emphasis. At the same time, 
scepticism was expressed that govern-
ments and the UN would grant civil so-
ciety such a powerful role.  
 
91. With regard to the geographical scope 
of action of an Alliance of Civilizations, 
the debate concentrated on two alternati-
ves: on the one hand, starting with the 
Euro-Mediterranean region as proving-
ground, and eventually amplifying it to the 
rest of the world, and on the other hand, 
designing the Alliance of Civilizations as a 
global scale initiative right from the start. 
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92. As mentioned before, on the Euro-
Mediterranean level, there is already a 
broad range of initiatives in place to foster 
dialogue and exchange. The idea of totally  
reducing the present initiative to the Medi-
terranean region was mostly rejected. 
However, the Mediterranean, being a rela-
tively small area where the West and the 
Arab-Muslim World are almost within 
sight of each other, was considered a very 
suitable proving-ground for this new ini-
tiative for a systematic cross-fertilization of 
cultures. In this regard, the Barcelona Pro-
cess could serve both as a source of syner-
gies as of lessons learned.  
 
93. The geostrategic dimensions of the 
Barcelona Process and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy are of highest im-
portance, beyond their being regional 
partnerships. The Alliance of Civilizations 
must be independent of the Barcelona 
Process, but take it into account. A series 
of key lessons can be drawn from ten years 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
which could be applied to the Alliance of 
Civilizations. First, approaches so far have 
been elitist, involving a small elite who is 
already well travelled and socialized. Se-
cond, educational exchange has been one-
way, south to north. Third, the focus has 
been on history heritage, going backwards 
rather than searching common ground for 
the present. Fourth, governments have 
been firmly maintaining control over the 
process, excluding oppositional civil socie-
ty. Fifth, there is a danger that these initia-
tives have become exercises just to show 
up autocratic regimes in the south and are 
being supported simply as a means of di-
verting tensions away from the real chal-
lenge, which is the lack of political rights, 
as they are wanted by citizens in all parts 
of the world, and about which there is 
nothing civilizational. 
 
94. Those in favour of a global scale 
launch of the initiative right from the start 
argued that the duty the Alliance needed 
to fulfil implied per se the need to operate 
on a much broader scale, not just regio-
nally, but globally. Since the initiative was 
based on the political will to foster multi-
lateralism, it must be a project of universal 
outreach, which to limit regionally, and be 
it only temporarily, would contradict its 
very raison d´être. The Alliance of Civiliza-
tions as a global initiative could contribute 
to foster a systematic worldwide process of 
cross-fertilization of civilizations, cultures 
and religions. Some participants expressed 
doubts that, within the framework of the 
United Nations, the initiative would be 
able to resist American and Western domi-
nance respectively, and might thus be de-
signed along the wishes and stereotypes of 
the powerful Western countries. In this ca-
se, it was argued, the continuation of hos-
tilities towards the West in the Arab-Mus-
lim civilization would be guaranteed and 
the initiative would be a failure right from 
the start.  
 
95. In terms of possible contents of the 
Alliance of Civilizations, the fields of ac-
tion it should operate in, a wide range of 
general and concrete suggestions was ma-
de, coming down to five broadly overlap-
ping fields: general information and know-
ledge, mass media, translations, streng-
thening civil society participation, and fos-
tering the regime of multilateralism within 
the context of UN Reform.  
 
96. It was repeatedly noted that the Allian-
ce of Civilizations initiative should rather 
aim at a more modest approach that wor-
ked than at a grandiose one that failed and 
was soon forgotten. Instead of trying to 
build a new world order, it was argued, the 
current dynamics to form this Alliance 
should be taken advantage of to make up 
something which might be small but at the 
same time so deeply rooted and strongly 
institutionalised that it outlasted govern-
ments and UN Secretary-Generals. Howe-
ver, it was added that even though propo-
sals should be tangible and realistic, rea-
lism must not dictate the goals. While re-
maining down-to-earth, utopias are worth 
preserving.  
 
97. An alliance on the general information 
level was considered a precondition for 
countering hostilities. It is commonplace 
that stereotypes, prejudices and antagonis-
Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada    
 20 
tic thinking can best flourish on the 
grounds of a lack of knowledge. Ignorance 
leads to a lack of recognition and mutual 
respect, and without recognition and mu-
tual respect, neither true dialogue nor an 
alliance is possible. Hence, enhancing 
knowledge of the other beyond stereotypes 
and name-dropping must form the elemen-
tary basis of an Alliance of Civilizations. 
While the lack of knowledge can be a great 
danger, where this deficit is efficiently tac-
kled,  the “weapons of knowledge” can al-
so be effectively used for the right cause. 
The creation of more cultural spaces in US, 
Europe and the Arab World was suggested 
as one possibility to enhance information. 
However, in order to reach not only the 
elites but all people, the pulse of such a 
knowledge and information alliance must 
obviously not be political security spee-
ches, UN reports, or similarly intangible 
channels, but the mass media.  
 
98. It was expressed that an alliance on the 
information level, however, cannot mean 
imposing one means of information on the 
other, as so far effectively exercised by 
CNN and BBC World. Al-Jazeera, today 
watched in 40 million households throug-
hout the Arab World, was created in res-
ponse to these basically “Western propa-
ganda networks”, in order to provide peo-
ple in the Arab World with a more balan-
ced information. At the same time, the 
propaganda machine underlying such bia-
sed reporting also works very efficiently in 
the West itself. The dominance of certain 
media, which substantially reduce critical 
and balanced debate especially in the US, 
but also in Europe, is decisive for the cur-
rent antagonist thinking. This indirect 
“thought police”, it was bewailed, deli-
berately spreads stereotypes, in order to 
keep up the “ideology of fear” with regard 
to the “foe image” of Islam. A concrete 
proposal in order to provide some counter-
balance to this unhealthy propaganda was 
to set up – in the Euro-Mediterranean con-
text – a two-sided TV channel which ai-
med at providing genuine, balanced infor-
mation of either side of the Sea, and which 
was designed to reach a broad public 
through a varied and attractive array of 
programmes. A similar idea might be deve-
loped with a global outreach.   
 
99. A related proposal aimed at enhancing 
information was to found a Mediterranean 
“Open University” on television (following 
the British 1970´s example), through 
which anyone interested could learn and 
get to know other realities. The cost of 
such a project was estimated to be consi-
derable, but not out of reach. An Open 
University, either of the Mediterranean or 
on a global scale, a TV channel with cul-
ture, history etc. with a mainly educational 
function, was considered to be a lasting 
way of bringing people of different back-
grounds and cultures together, and was 
believed to be something that would last 
much longer than conferences. Both pro-
posals, the independent TV channel as 
well as the Open University, were conside-
red proposals able to effectively reach out 
to the people, and were thus received with 
great enthusiasm and broad approval. 
 
100. The same was said to be true about a 
proposal made to bring underway massive 
translations in order to enhance know-
ledge and understanding between the Arab 
World and the West. Given the poor 
knowledge especially of Arab-Muslim phi-
losophy and literature in the West, there 
was a broad consensus that spending a 
substantial amount of money to bring 
about translations of philosophy, contem-
porary literature and poetry, and also of 
school manuals, news and other hard fact 
sources on a massive scale, was considered 
a highly worthwhile investment.  
 
101. In order to strengthen civil society 
and involve the people on the national and 
local levels, first of all, an Alliance of Civi-
lizations should ensure that in all parti-
cipating countries there actually exists a 
civil society worth the term. Civil society 
is, generally speaking, all organized society 
between public institutions and the mar-
ket. Civil society is the society organized 
with the objective of defending some inte-
rests, be they economic, social or cultural. 
Civil society groups must be autonomous, 
meaning above all not party- or govern-
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ment-related, and internally democratic, 
implying above all representation by elec-
tion. The framework for civil society ac-
tion is provided by institutionalised plu-
ralism, which again is manifested by free-
dom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation, both not only de iure but also de 
facto. However, deficits in practical imple-
mentation do not imply that one should 
not collaborate with civil society unless it 
enjoys perfect liberties. On the contrary, 
alliances with local civil societies support 
them in attaining these liberties to a full 
scale. One of the most essential elements 
in a pluralist civil society is the capacity of 
societal groups to represent their interests 
and demands, and to be able to negotiate 
towards a resolution of conflict of inte-
rests. Here again, we cannot wait for de-
mocracy to enforce civil society. Civil so-
ciety is a condition to facilitate the pro-
gress of democracy and, once it has arri-
ved, to socially assimilate democratic prin-
ciples in order to maintain democracy. 
 
102. Strengthening civil society and en-
hancing their participation could be an 
enormous field of action for the Alliance of 
Civilizations. At a governmental level, the 
Alliance could facilitate the adoption of 
norms in favour of freedom and recogni-
tion of civil society organizations. Moreo-
ver, it could form alliances between the 
different civil society organizations in the 
different countries through exchange and 
collaboration programs. 
 
103. In terms of global governance, the 
Alliance of Civilizations initiative could 
contribute to a government reform on the 
global level, that is, to UN Reform. We are 
in a special moment of the history of in-
ternational organizations where there is a 
meeting of minds and a will to reform glo-
bal governance in order to prevent a con-
centration of power, which must be seized. 
Doubt was expressed on whether it was 
feasible to change global government prior 
to national ones, thereby giving more po-
wer to undemocratic regimes. In response, 
it was argued that the first step in a global 
governance reform must be to deconcen-
trate power in the United Nations Organi-
zation itself. In particular, the need to put 
an end to the monopoly of power in the 
Security Council was emphasized, as well 
as the need to give a larger role to the Ge-
neral Assembly, especially in the decision-
making process regarding peace and secu-
rity issues. Political pressure, it was ar-
gued, is possible even under the present 
balance of power, and should be built on.  
 
104. Participants were reminded that after 
all, the Alliance of Civilizations was plan-
ned as a UN-based initiative, and thus 
must take into account how the UN could 
be involved. While there was general 
agreement that the Alliance of Civiliza-
tions should influence the process of UN 
Reform, no concrete proposals were made 
as to how and through which measures 
such influence could be established.  
 
 
 
Outlook 
 
105. Towards the closing of the seminar, 
the plenary agreed that some important 
and very tangible ideas had emerged, such 
as a focus on the role of the media, a Me-
diterranean or global Open University, 
translations on a massive scale, etc., which 
would all provide a wonderful start. Now, 
beyond the analysis of contemporary pro-
blems and the brainstorming for concrete 
measures, the principles and ideas on the 
table need to be reframed more concretely. 
As the UN representative pointed out, the 
contents of the Alliance of Civilizations 
will now be laid down in a political con-
cept, which will eventually provide the 
foundation for an action plan of concrete 
measures. This political concept, as well as 
the plan of action containing concrete, tan-
gible measures, will be awaited benevo-
lently by all participants and speakers of 
this seminar. 
 
106. One participant declared that he had 
arrived at Madrid with a rather critical atti-
tude towards the Alliance of Civilizations, 
but had learned throughout the debates of 
the past two days to grow more positive 
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about the initiative. Beyond all semantic 
adjustments, he said, the symbolic value of 
the initiative must be underlined, and in 
politics, symbols were of great importance. 
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